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"Concrete" Forms of Intellectual Property
Robert J. Fay*
T HE FIELD of intellectual property as treated in this paper en-
compasses mental products of industrial importance: in-
ventions or discoveries, literary or artistic works, trade secrets,
and distinguishing trademarks or trade names used in commerce.
Each of these is characterized by mental activity followed by
embodiment in some concrete form. Protection in a measure for
the originator is found both in the statutes and in common law.
Inventions and Patents
Not all inventions or discoveries are patentable. It is im-
portant to discern that patentable inventions constitute only a
part of the mental endeavor called invention. For example, a
method of marketing a product may solve a sales problem and
be highly successful in actual application. That this is an "in-
vention" is clear if we accept as criteria of invention the premise
of mental activity directed to the solution of a problem and em-
bodiment in some form. However, a patent cannot be secured
on a method of doing business. The reason is simply that the
statute creating patents under constitutional provision does not
so provide.
If it were not for the Patent Laws, many inventors would
be unwilling or unable to carry forward their inventions. Many
others would maintain inventions in secrecy as long as possible
instead of patenting them, which stimulates others to make still
further inventions in the form of improvements and the like.
Under the provisions of 35 U. S. C. § 101, the inventor or dis-
coverer of any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter may, subject to certain conditions, obtain
a patent for it. These four categories are known as the statu-
tory classes of invention. With the exception of certain plants
and certain designs, it is only within these classes that a patent
can be obtained.
Consequently, a new invention may be in a product, such
as a camera, which is a new type of manufacture. It may be
made by a special machine which may also be patentable; and
the particular chemicals used in connection with the film for that
camera might be a composition of matter. The method of making
the camera and film might be a mechanical or chemical process.
Every industrial organization today has at some time considered
each of the above categories of invention, and frequently has
made the decision to file patent applications.
Other useful techniques may be unpatentable when they do
not rise to the dignity of invention as interpreted by our laws.
Some of these techniques may be retained as trade secrets or
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"know-how" and licensed two companies to enable the licensee to
pick up business aspects or "tricks of the trade" more readily.
"Know-how" licenses, as well as patent licenses, are important
as the means by which ideas are conveyed and revenues obtained
from research and development. It is almost impossible today to
keep ideas secret. There is a great deal of employee turnover,
most plants can be visited by members of the public who can
see for themselves the techniques of manufacture, the processes
employed, and the products manufactured; and, of course, the
customers visiting can witness the overall picture.
To the small inventor, a patent serves as a means of exclud-
ing others from the manufacture of a device, and he can license
others to make his invention for a fee. For the company, a pat-
ent serves as a means of protecting its rights by excluding others
from manufacturing the invention. In some cases it is a means
of getting revenue from a second or third license, if the market
requires additional manufacturing sources beyond one's means.
In the automotive field, in which multiple sources are a require-
ment, this is a common practice. A company may further take
advantage of foreign patent rights and export its inventions into
countries where labor rates or local laws would ordinarily pre-
vent the importing of products.
Negative Rules of Invention
Perhaps the simplest way of contemplating invention is to
consider what is not invention. These are known as the negative
rules of invention.
1. Mere Skill-Mere skill is not an invention; that is, to pro-
duce a process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or
design which any skillful mechanic, electrician, chemist, or other
expert would produce when required to solve this problem.'
2. Substitution of Materials-It is not invention to substitute
one well-known material for another in the same art.2
3. Change of Size-It is not invention to strengthen or en-
large a product or machine so that it will operate on larger ma-
terial than before.8
4. Change of Degree-It is not invention to change the size
or the degree of an article or a machine.4
5. Reversal of Parts-It is not invention to reverse parts
which produce no new and useful result.5
1 Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U. S. 192, 199, 27 L. Ed. 438, 440 (1882);
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U. S. 560, 93 L. Ed. 235 (1949).
2 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 Howard 248, 266, 13 L. Ed. 683, 690 (1850).
3 Willamette Iron & Steel Works v. Columbia Eng. Wks., 252 F. 594 (9th
Cir., 1918).
4 Baldwin v. Kresl, 76 F. 823 (1896); Detroit v. Fitzgerald, 89 F. 2d 178
(7th Cir., 1937).
5 Hamilton Beach Mfg. Co. v. P. A. Geier Co., 230 F. 430, 437 (7th Cir.,
1916).
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6. Multiplication of Parts-It is not invention to make an in-
vention of more than one part when it was originally known to
be of an integral construction. The converse is also true."
7. Converting a Manual Operation to a Mechanical Opera-
tion-It is not invention to convert a hand-operated machine to
mechanical operation if there has been no substantial change in
the mechanics or method of making a product.7
8. Duplication of Parts-It is not invention to duplicate one
or more parts of a machine unless the duplication causes a new
mode of operation or produces a new unitary result.8
9. Omission of Parts-It is not invention to omit one or more
parts of a machine unless the omission causes some new mode
of operation of the remaining parts.9
10. Substitution of Equivalents-It is not invention to
change a portion of a process, machine, manufacture or com-
position of matter by substituting an equivalent for any of its
parts unless the new part performs some new and additional
function besides the function it performed originally. 10
11. Combination-It is not invention to combine old devices
into a new machine or manufacture without producing any new
mode of operation."
12. Aggregation-Mere aggregation of a number of old parts
which perform no new or different function than that heretofore
performed is not patentable. 12
These are merely guides, and exceptions exist. If some un-
expected or unobvious result is secured by reason of changing
size, or the color, etc., invention may be found to exist.
Trade Secrets
Completely outside the generally recognized field of Patents
is that of trade secrets which are protectable at common law and
at equity. This field of trade secrets, much misunderstood, is
grounded on the concept that a person who conceives an idea
has the right to keep the work which he has done to himself.
The fact that another might rediscover or conceive of the same
idea himself, does not authorize this latter person to steal or
pilfer the idea from the first party. This entire field then is
0 Howard v. Detroit Stove Works, 150 U. S. 164, 170, 37 L. Ed. 1039 (1893).
7 Thropp's Sons Co. v. Seiberling, 264 U. S. 320, 328, 68 L. Ed. 708 (1924);
Ronneny v. Caterpillar, 129 F. 2d 70 (7th Cir., 1942), cert. den., 317 U. S. 670,
87 L. Ed. 538 (1942).
8 Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S. 187 (1876).
9 Stow v. Chicago, 3 Bann. & Ard. 83, 92 (1877), aff'd., 104 U. S. 547, 26 L.
Ed. 816 (1881); Utah v. General Motors, 106 F. 2d 5 (2d Cir., 1939).
10 Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, 119, 22 L. Ed. 566, 567 (1875).
11 A. & P. v. Supermarket, 340 U. S. 147, 95 L. Ed. 162 (1950).
12 Lincoln Eng. Co. v. Stewart Warner, 303 U. S. 545; 82 L. Ed. 1008 (1938).
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somewhat broader than trade secrets alone, and invades that of
unfair competition, which, in the first instance, was limited to
situations where a party had sought to "pass off" as his goods
those of another. This has now been greatly expanded to a much
wider interpretation, and perhaps a better phrase would be "un-
fair business practices." An example might be one like the fol-
lowing: By bribery you induce a competitor's employee to give
you certain of his trade secrets.
As found in the case of In re Brosnahan, Jr.,1 3 and in the
case of Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 14 a trade
secret is properly
The right of an inventor to the product of his talent and is
recognized by the common law, and no constitutional statu-
tory provision of the United States was, or ever has been,
necessary to the right of any person to make an invention,
discovery or machine, or to use it when made, or to sell it
to some one else. Such a right has always existed, and
would exist now if all patent laws were repealed. It is a
right which may be called a natural right, and which, so
far as may be regulated by law, belongs to ordinary, mu-
nicipal legislation; and it is unaffected by anything in the
constitution or patent laws of the United States.
Trade secret law is an important aspect of the protection of
industrial property rights in that frequently an idea may not be
patentable or, if patentable, there is some bar to the granting
of a patent. Consequently, when a company or individual wishes
to sell a right in a secret process of some type, this can be done
by contract. When one party discloses his idea to a second party
and the second later uses the idea, this latter party has to pay a
stipulated sum for its use. There must be an agreement for com-
pensation in order for this contract to be valid.
It goes without saying, of course, that a particular idea or
invention, patentable or unpatentable, to constitute a trade secret
must be kept secret.
Trademarks
A trademark is a word, name, symbol, or device used by a
manufacturer to identify his goods in commerce and to distinguish
them from those of other manufacturers.' 5 A right to a trade-
mark does not simply accrue to the first user, but only to the
first user to use the mark in connection with the particular
goods identified. 1 To fully comprehend the meaning of a trade-
13 In re Brosnahan, Jr., 18 F. 62, 64 (D. C. Mo., 1883).
14 Six Wheel Corp. v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 F. 2d 568 (9th Cir.,
1931).
15 Sec. 45, Trademark Act of 1946, as amended.
16 Tillman & Bendel v. California Packing Corp., 63 F. 2d 498, 506 (9th
Cir., 1933), cert den., 290 U. S. 638, 78 L. Ed. 554, 54 Sup. Ct. 55 (1933);
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F. 2d 34 (2nd Cir., 1945).
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mark, we should understand that a trademark can consist of a
word, such as "Lux" for toilet soap. Thus, for example, "Jeep"
is a trademark for two and four wheel drive military and com-
mercial vehicles made by Willys Motors, Inc. It is not the generic
name for all small vehicles. A trademark can be the housemark
of a family of products made by a company. For example, Dow
and Du Pont are housemarks and each has a series of product
marks underneath the housemark. All of these characteristics
do not change the pattern that a workmark such as "Kodak" or
"Jeep," together with a word and design mark and sometimes a
design mark alone, are used to identify the goods or services
of a manufacturer.
In addition to the foregoing marks relating to products there
are service marks,17 representing the quality of service that may
be obtained from the service of a particular manufacturer if in
general no product is involved. In addition, there are collective
marks' such as "Sunkist" and certification marks 8 such as "Good
Housekeeping Seal." To this background, which is provided for
in the Trademark Act of 1946 or "Lanham Act," we now have a
sound background of Trademark Law, but this did not come
about with any ease. We must start back to the point where
there were Merchants' Marks. These have been used for many
thousand of years, but the Trademark Law, in practice as we
now know it, did not develop until relatively recently.
When and How They Started
Trademarks did not develop as a valuable symbol of good
will as long as producers and consumers were in close contact;
that is to say, before the 17th Century there was no need for
trademarks as symbols of good will. There was need for them
as Merchants' Marks. From antiquity we find early silversmiths
and early potters that have used Merchants' Marks. In 1766,
when the second volume of Blackstone's Commentaries came out,
there was no reference whatsoever to trademarks, though, of
course, patents and copyrights were discussed. United States
Trademarks were granted by Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of
State, in 1791, to Boston Sailmakers. They did not become im-
portant assets of value in commerce in contradistinction to local
trade until about 1850. In the 1860's and 1870's the first trade-
mark acts were passed. However, in 1870 only 121 trademarks
were registered. In contrast to this, there are now 15,355 trade-
marks in an average year, such as 1958. The first trademark
statute was enacted in this country in 1870 and a further im-
provement or revision in 1876. Although the English courts at
this time were basing injunction and damages for trademark in-
fringement upon the theory of deceit, the American courts were
basing theirs on unjust enrichment.
17 15 U. S. C. §1053.
is 15 U. S. C. §1054.
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As this Trademark Law developed, there was some concern
to determine the principles by which the adjudication of trade-
mark infringement may be made. In the leading decision of
Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf19 the United States Supreme
Court stated:
The redress that is accorded in trade-mark cases is based
upon the party's right to be protected in the good-will of a
trade or business. The primary and proper function of a
trade-mark is to identify the origin or ownership of the
article to which it is affixed . . . Courts afford redress or
relief upon the ground that a party has valuable interest in
the good-will of his trade or business, and in the trade-
marks adopted to maintain and extend it. The essence of
the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manu-
facturer or vendor for those of another.
Thus, a trademark is a guarantee to the consumer, when it
is used in the same channels of trade as certain other goods that
have given the consumer satisfaction. He can learn to rely upon
the name.
Medieval proprietary marks, while not strictly speaking
trademarks in the modern sense of the word, were an important
factor in the development of modern Trademark Law. As ap-
pears from municipal documents and records of courts, and also
from the Statute of 27 Edward II, Merchants' Marks were
granted as establishing prima facie, and often even conclusive,
evidence of the ownership of goods to which they were affixed.
This proprietary significance of Merchants' Marks still survives,
and distinctly tinges the judicial concept of the function of a
trademark. At some time, then, the liability aspect of a trade-
mark, which showed against whom a dissatisfied buyer could
go, drifted at some point to an asset mark whereby he knew
he could rely upon that name for future items. Thus, the
primary function of a trademark became that of identifying the
source of the goods.
Trademarks, like copyrights, are enforceable at common law
or, if registered, under state or federal law.
Registration in accordance with state or federal laws estab-
lishes, for the proprietor of the mark, jurisdiction and a prima
facie case of exclusive right which in effect shifts the burden of
proof to the other user. Enforcement of an unregistered mark
necessitates establishment of exclusive right to the mark by the
claimant.
Copyright
A copyright is a literary and artistic property right to pre-
vent unauthorized copying of writings, musical compositions, pic-
tures and works of art. It is derived from the author's right, in-
19 Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 412-413 (1915).
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herited in our common law from England, that from time "where-
of the memory of man runneth not to the contrary," the author's
right to his works of manuscripts was recognized as a principle
of law, because it was the product of intellectual labor.20 In its
modern form, according to the Constitution,2 1 Congress has pro-
vided in the most recent Act (the Copyright Act of 1947) that
for a limited time authors may have exclusive rights to their
writings for 28 years, renewable for 28 additional years.22 This
is in contrast to the common law rights and is a statutory grant
by the Government of a species of monopoly, meant to encourage
the production and publication of literary, dramatic, musical and
artistic works. The author must comply with certain formalities,
such as providing proper notice that the work is copyrighted, in a
specialized form, and he must, in general, provide two copies of
the best edition to the Library of Congress. The copyright arises
merely by the act of claiming it at the time of publication, by
placing notation thereof and the date on the published work.
Registration of this claim is provided by Statute,22 and has the
important aspects of conferring jurisdiction upon the federal
courts where the right to exclude others from copying may be
enforced, by providing the claimant with a prima facie case of
exclusive right.
Two authors could conceivably write the identical work, and
each could register a valid copyright. Two people might take
identical pictures of the Washington Monument. Each could
register a valid copyright because the essence of the wrong is
copying. The registration is formal and no proof of novelty or
originality is required.
Copyright Law started during the Protestant Reformation,
when Stationers' Company, the leading publisher of London, was
established by decree to protect the spread of Protestantism. It
concentrated the whole world of publishing business in its hand. 23
Out of this has grown Copyright Law, which has restricted the
exclusive right of publication to a term of years.24 This latter
was begun with the celebrated Statute of Anne. 25 In this country
we borrowed from those sections liberally, and our first Copy-
right Act was passed in 1790.26 The most recent act is the Copy-
right Act of 1947.27 This act, forgetting for the moment the com-
plexities of intercountry operations, permits an individual au-
thor or composer, who complies with certain formalities and
20 Blackstone, 2 Com. 405.
21 Article 1, § 8.
22 Copyright Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 652, Title 17, U. S. C.
23 Hallam, 1 Const. History 238.
24 Drone, Law of Property in Intellectual Productions 69.
25 Statute of Anne, 8 Anne Ch. 19, 1710; Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burrows
2303 (1774); Constitution, Art. I, §8.
26 Op. cit. supra note 3.
27 Op. cit. supra note 4.
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copyrights his work, revenue for a period of 56 years for repro-
ductions of that work. Although this period might be considered
too short, it provides a means whereby the author's right to his
own writings can really be protected, without danger of piracy
of that right. This right has now been construed, in some in-
stances, to mean that the rights to other media, such as the re-
working of a book into a play or a motion picture story, are also
protected. Although there is still a need for improvement and
there is constant attention focused on the weaknesses of the act,
it is still a big step forward in protecting literary and artistic
rights. It is a part of the main body of intellectual property
rights.
It is only in efforts to stretch the property right law that its
big weakness is found. It does not protect, except in limited
ways, the title to a book or play, and, further, it does not protect
the plot to a story. For example, copyrighting the rules to a
game of "Monopoly" does not mean that the game is protected,
apart from the reproduction of the rules in their identical form.
In this instance, the trademark "Monopoly" probably protects
it more than anything else, and the copyright on the game board
is similarly protected. A patent, however, provided the best
protection until it ran out after 17 years.
28
A copyright is used to signify both statutory copyright and
common law copyright, but a statutory copyright is not a natural
right; it is an intangible right, privilege or franchise granted
through Congress by the United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec.
8.29 It must be carefully brought out that the copyright protects
only the subject matter, treatment and content of the work. The
title is protected by the law of unfair competition. It may be that
a work that received only little publicity and sold few copies,
whose title comes into prominence because of a popular favorite,
has little or no right to prevent a popular novel or play from
using the title, since copyright cases arise under statutes of the
United States. The forum for infringement of a statutory copy-
right is the federal courts.
One of the big problems in copyrights is how to protect a
format for a radio program or other type of program. This was
accomplished in a California court, in a now famous case, for a
test program involving audience participation in a show that was
later to be made into a movie.30
A still further problem is that of protecting two dimensional
and three dimensional works of art. In 1954 this much litigated
problem was resolved in Mazer v. Stein,31 which held valid copy-
28 U. S. Patent No. 2,198,670 to Johnson.
29 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8 reads: "To promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
30 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 192 P. 2d 495 (Cal. App. 1948);
affd., 208 P. 2d 9 (1949).
31 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201 (Mar. 8, 1954).
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rights on statuettes as works of art although they were pub-
lished as lamp bases, i.e., useful articles, and notwithstanding a
possibility that they might have been protected by design pat-
ents. The advantage was that design patents would have a maxi-
mum term of fourteen years, while copyright protection, if re-
newed, would last 56 years. It has been this decision which has
opened the door to many types of ornamental design protection
for any manner of useful articles. However, because of time limi-
tations, it has not always been possible, and certain categories
do not fit within the copyright statute as works of art. As a
consequence, there is under consideration a new type of design
law patterned after the copyright law, covering designs not now
adequately protected. Under proposed legislation, a design regis-
tration would be obtained quickly by simple registration, and
would provide for protection for a limited period, possibly five
years, against those who copy instead of originating their own
designs.32 This would have a stimulating result on product de-
signs, instead of fostering design piracy.
The importance to industry of these forms of intellectual
property can be appreciated in the realization that about 60% of
the approximately 50,000 patents issuing each year are assigned
to corporations. Annually about 15,000 trademarks are registered
to corporations, both domestic and foreign, engaged in business
in the classes where such marks are registered. 33
32 H. R. 8873, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
33 "Distribution of Patents 1939-1955," U. S. Senate, Conmmittee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., Study No. 3, 1953.
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